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A PROPOSAL TO REFINE THE SUITABILITY STANDARD
BY QUANTIFYING RECOMMENDATION RISK AND
CLIENT APPROPRIATE RISK LEVELS
Unsuitable recommendation of securities is one of the most common
and costly claims in the brokerage industry.1
Perhaps the clearest example of a suitability violation occurs where a
broker recommends speculative securities to a customer whose financial
situation clearly calls for conservative investments (for example, a retired
person who needs the income from his investments for his living expenses
and who has no reasonable expectation of being able to replace any
substantial trading losses).2

The current standard for determining “unsuitability” is subjective: Whether
the broker reasonably believed his recommendation to be suitable for his
client when he made it. The enormous quantity of claims3 suggests that
such a subjective standard may not be satisfactory and that refinement of
the applicable laws and rules may be necessary. Without a clear standard,
brokers may not know whether their recommendations are suitable.
Similarly, attorneys for claimants and respondents have difficulty assessing
their own cases. An objective standard based on financial data currently
available to brokers is a better solution and would better guide brokers in
making recommendations to their clients. Such a standard would improve
the ability of lawyers to assess their clients’ cases, thus reducing the
quantity of claims filed by investors and increasing the amount of
settlements when claims were filed.
Unsuitable recommendations are proscribed by securities industry selfregulatory organization4 (SRO) rules which require that a broker “have
reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation [of a security] is
suitable for such customer.”5 The Second Circuit requires five elements to
1. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1557, 1557 (1999).
In an Avoidance and Prevention Advisory (Advisory) distributed to its member firms
in May 1998, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) disclosed
that unsuitability claims account for ninety-five percent of filings under NASD
members’ errors and omissions insurance policies. “Because they are the most
common yet most ambiguous of all client accusations,” the Advisory said,
“‘unsuitability’ claims can often create significant problems for your firm. This is
because what constitutes a viable unsuitability claim is open to debate.”
Id.

2. NORMAN POSER, BROKER DEALER REGULATION § 3.03 (3d ed. 2005).
3. NASD.com, NASD Dispute Resolution Statistics, Summary Arbitration Statistics
October 2006, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&nodeId=516&ss
SourceNodeId=12.
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission sanctioned and approved the self-regulatory
organizations including the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock
Exchange to propose, implement, and enforce rules of conduct for the securities industry.
5. NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310; NYSE RULES R. 405.
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prove a claim of unsuitability under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the ‘34 Act) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.6 Federal
courts have required scienter in the recommendation of an unsuitable
security, and that damages resulted from the investor’s justifiable reliance
on that recommendation.7
The current standard for proving unsuitability, under federal law and
SRO Rules, requires proof that the broker lacked a reasonable belief that the
recommended security was suitable for his client.8 This standard is
unsatisfactory because it is “nebulous and amorphous.”9 This lack of a clear
standard causes problems of proof for claimants, rebuttal for respondents
and fails to establish satisfactory prophylactic direction.10
This article proposes a standard which quantifies the amount of risk
inherent in a broker’s recommendation and compares that risk to the client’s
appropriate risk level, and that certain objectively determined levels of risk
are presumptively suitable or unsuitable for brokers to recommend to
clients based upon their risk profile.
Part I of this article discusses the development and current state of
unsuitability claims under SRO and federal law. Part II suggests that the
suitability standard should be objective and weigh the level of risk inherent
in a broker’s recommendation against the client’s appropriate risk level.
Part III proposes an objective standard for determining suitability: the
comparison of Risk Quotient (RQ)11 to Client Appropriate Risk Level
(CARL);12 and discusses brokers’ and investors’ responsibility to explain
and understand risk; and investors’ acceptance of market risk when they
invest in securities.
Part IV of this article proposes that an RQ less than or equal to one (RQ
≤ 1.0) is presumptively suitable for any investor; that an RQ greater than or
6. See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993); 15 U.S.C. §
78a, et seq.
7. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031.
8. Id.
9. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1557 (“The suitability doctrine, always somewhat nebulous
and amorphous with respect to its content and parameters. . . .”).
10. Roger W. Reinsch, J. Bradley Reich and Nauzer Balsara, Trust Your Broker?: Suitability,
Modern Portfolio Theory, And Expert Witnesses, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173, 173 (Winter, 2004)
(“The issues in and surrounding suitability claims are complex, yet surprisingly little has been
written on this topic.”); Stuart D. Root, Suitability—The Sophisticated Investor—and Modern
Portfolio Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287, 289 (1991) (“The problems of
‘unsuitability’—what does it mean, how is it measured, who should bear the risk of determining
suitability—are not new. But these problems will most certainly become more frequent and arcane
as the architecture of investment securities and strategies becomes more exotic.”).
11
Risk Quotient (RQ) is a term proposed by the author in this article. It is a measure of the risk of
a position or portfolio of equity securities where the numerator is the volatility or beta and the
denominator is the percentage of equity, which recognizes the impact of leverage on risk.
12
Client Appropriate Risk Level (CARL) is also a term proposed by the author in this article. It
signifies the objectively determinable amount of risk appropriate for a client despite her subjective
view or her broker’s opinion.
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equal to 2.0 (RQ ≥ 2.0) is presumptively unsuitable for any investor;
discusses the impact of an objective standard for suitability claims; and
concludes that a clear, well-defined standard is necessary for meaningful
review of unsuitability awards. This article concludes that a clear, welldefined standard is necessary to avert a developing crisis where both
claimants and respondents are bound to arbitrate, but have no meaningful
review of awards available to them.
I. SRO AND FEDERAL UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS
A. SRO RULES PROHIBIT UNSUITABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND
MAY RESULT IN DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AND SANCTIONS
Investors may bring a claim of unsuitability before an arbitration
panel13 under NASD Rule 231014 or under NYSE Rule 405.15 “Although the
NYSE does not have a general suitability rule, its ‘know your customer’
rule requires NYSE members to use ‘due diligence to learn the essential
facts relative to every customer [and] every order.’”16 The NASD, on the
other hand, specifically addresses unsuitable recommendations:
Recommendations to Customers (Suitability)
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts,
if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as
to his financial situation and needs.
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a noninstitutional customer, other than transactions with customers where
investments are limited to money market mutual funds, a member shall
make reasonable efforts to obtain information concerning:
(1) the customer’s financial status;
(2) the customer’s tax status;
(3) the customer’s investment objectives; and
13. Under NASD Rule 10302, a panel of three arbitrators hears cases that have claims of
damages in excess of $25,000, while amounts under $25,000 are decided by a single arbitrator on
the basis of pleadings, and are known as “paper cases.” NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R.
10302.
14. Id. R.2310.
15. NYSE RULES R. 405 (“Rule 405. Diligence as to Accounts. Every member organization is
required through a general partner, a principal executive officer or a person or persons designated
under the provisions of Rule 342(b)(1) to (1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative
to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such
organization and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by
such organization. Supervision of Accounts (2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by
registered representatives of the organization.”).
16. POSER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-89.
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(4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by
such member or registered representative in making recommendations
to the customer.17

Additional NASD broker duties are found in the, so called, “Know
Your Customer Rule” where, “Members’ responsibilities include having a
reasonable basis for recommending a particular security or strategy. In
addition, the know-your-customer requirement . . .requires a careful review
of the appropriateness of transactions in low-priced, speculative securities,
whether solicited or unsolicited.”18 Thus, a broker is required to learn about
the investor’s financial condition,19 including the investor’s source of funds
for the account, the investor’s goals for these funds, and the investor’s
ability to sustain risk20 before making any recommendation.
The Second Circuit has found that NASD Rules “prohibit[] the sale to a
customer by a broker or dealer of unsuitable securities.”21 In furtherance of
this end, the NASD rules state that, “[i]n recommending to a customer the
purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.”22
Accordingly, to make a suitable recommendation,23 a broker must
17. NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310.
18. Members Reminded to Use Best Practices When Dealing in Speculative Securities,
SPECIAL NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 96-32, May 9, 1996, at 233 (emphasis added); Lowenfels,
supra note 1, at 1560.
Four months later, in response to protests from discount brokers, the NASD purported
to “clarify” the above reference to “unsolicited transactions” by issuing Notice to
Members 96-60: “A member’s suitability obligation under Rule 2310 applies only to
securities that have been recommended by the member. It would not apply, therefore,
to situations in which a member acts solely as an order-taker for persons who, on their
own initiative, effect transactions without a recommendation from the member.”
Id.

19. NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310.
20. See generally DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL § 5-5
(5th ed. 2003).
21. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600–601 (2d Cir. 1978).
22. See NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2110. The rule also requires members and their
brokers to “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade.” Id.
23. Because what constitutes a recommendation may also be the subject of a claim or defense,
the NASD issued the following statement:
[A] broad range of circumstances may cause a transaction to be considered
recommended, and this determination does not depend on the classification of the
transaction by a particular member as “solicited” or “unsolicited.” In particular, a
transaction will be considered to be recommended when the member or its associated
person brings a specific security to the attention of the customer through any means,
including, but not limited to, direct telephone communication, the delivery of
promotional material through the mail, or the transmission of electronic messages.

2006]

A Proposal to Refine the Suitability Standard

235

understand the risks inherent in the investment and believe that such risks
are justified by the potential rewards in light of the investor’s financial
situation.24
Arbitration panels often cite the “speculative nature of a stock;”25 when
determining suitability. In recent years, that an investment was a “tech
stock” or “technology stock;”26 and most commonly that the investment
was “high risk,” “risky” or “volatile”27 has been cited. Currently, only two
available SRO arbitration awards cite considerations of objective statistical
comparison between recommended securities and the broader markets.28
The descriptions of the securities at issue in suitability claims are arbitrary,
and “[n]o securities industry standard of conduct is more frequently cited,

NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 96-60, Sept. 1996, at 474.
24. See Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969).
[A Broker] cannot recommend a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable
basis for such recommendation. He must disclose facts which he knows and those
which are reasonably ascertainable. By his recommendation he implies that a
reasonable investigation has been made and that his recommendation rests on the
conclusions based on such investigation. Where the salesman lacks essential
information about a security, he should disclose this as well as the risks which arise
from his lack of information.
Id.

25. On November 14, 2006 the following LexisNexis search produced 56 results, composed of
NASD and NYSE reported awards and disciplinary decisions: “Source: Securities > SelfRegulatory Organizations (SRO) Materials > Combined NYSE & NASD materials,” “Terms:
‘speculative nature’ w/50 suitab!.”
26. On November 14, 2006 the following LexisNexis search produced 81 results, composed of
NASD and NYSE reported awards and disciplinary decisions: “Source: Combined NYSE &
NASD materials,” “Terms: suitab! w/50 (‘tech stock’ or ‘technology stock’).”
27. On November 14, 2006 the following LEXIS search produced 2,842 results, composed of
NASD and NYSE reported awards and disciplinary decisions: “Source: National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) Arbitration Awards,” “Terms: suitability & (risk! or volatil!)”.
Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1575–1576 (“The SEC agreed that the broker’s recommendations,
taken as a whole, were unsuitable for the customer’s account. The broker’s firm, at one time or
another, had been an underwriter for each of the eleven securities at issue. The vast majority of
these companies had operating losses and no anticipation of paying dividends. In addition, at least
seven of these companies had offerings that were characterized by the prospectus as involving
substantial or a high degree of risk. The SEC wrote: . . . ‘The concentration of high risk and
speculative securities in Bradley’s account, which were predominately underwritten by Paulson
[broker’s firm], was not suitable.’”).
28. In the Matter of the DeNicola v. First Union Brokerage Services, Inc., 2004 NASD Arb.
LEXIS 1072 (May 21, 2004) (“The objectivity of the use of the Beta analysis as a tool to assess
past performance outweighs Mr. Lyman’s essentially unsupported, subjective, if not speculative,
approach to determining suitability.”); In the Matter of Roger and Mary Candace Brush v. Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2004 NASD Arb. LEXIS 3073 (Dec. 10, 2004)
(“Considerable energy was expended during the hearing on the question of using either standard
deviation or beta as tools in choosing and explaining choices of securities. As aids to brokers in
choosing stocks, both standard deviation and beta are helpful, but as aids in explaining to
unsophisticated clients which stocks were chosen, they are very likely useless.”).
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and least objectively applied, than the ‘suitability’ requirement for
stockbrokers.”29
Brokers and broker-dealers are subject to disciplinary actions by the
SEC and SROs for making unsuitable recommendations.
In Bartholomew, the respondent . . . sold high-risk direct investments to
several retired or close-to-retirement investors. The investors had
expressly informed Bartholomew that they desired liquid, incomeproducing, low-risk investments. The respondent . . . misrepresented to
these customers the liquidity, risks, and benefits of the direct investments.
The SEC found that the respondent had violated Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 by selling investments that were unsuitable for the purchasers in
view of their age, modest financial condition, and conservative investment
objectives.30

The NASD Sanction Guidelines for violation of Rule 2310 include
“monetary sanction, suspension, bar, or other sanctions.”31 Adjudicators of
disciplinary actions are instructed to consider monetary fines ranging from
$2,500 to $50,000 and to consider
[s]uspend[ing] respondent [broker-dealer] in any or all capacities for a
period of 10 business days to one year. In egregious cases, [adjudicators
should] consider a longer suspension (of up to two years) or a bar of an
individual respondent. Also [adjudicators should] consider suspending
respondent member firm with respect to any or all activities or functions
for up to two years.32

29. Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for
Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 189, 189 (1998).
30. POSER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-97.
31. NASD, NASD SANCTION GUIDELINES 99 (2006).
32. Id. at 2 n.1 (“This guideline also is appropriate for violations of MSRB Rule G-19.”);
As set forth in General Principle No. 6, Adjudicators should increase the
recommended fine amount by adding the amount of a respondent’s financial benefit
or require respondent to offer rescission to the injured customers. In this instance, the
factors to be considered in the calculation of financial benefit should include the
amount of any commissions or other profits that the respondent derived from the
unsuitable trading.
Id. at 2 n.2;
The National Adjudicatory Council (NAC), formerly the National Business Conduct
Committee, has developed the NASD Sanction Guidelines for use by the various
bodies adjudicating disciplinary decisions, including Hearing Panels and the NAC
itself (collectively, the Adjudicators), in determining appropriate remedial sanctions.
NASD has published the NASD Sanction Guidelines so that members, associated
persons, and their counsel may become more familiar with the types of disciplinary
sanctions that may be applicable to various violations.
Id. at 1.
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The standard of proof required for sanctions may be higher than that for
recovery of damages by claimants, but is subjective nonetheless. For
example, “[a] broker who knowingly engages in unsuitable trading violates
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. [The broker’s]
trading [of] highly speculative options in customer accounts, in disregard of
customer objectives, resources, and sophistication, clearly constituted
unsuitable trading in violation of the antifraud provisions.”33
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS UNDER
FEDERAL LAW
Claims based on unsuitable recommendations began to appear in
federal courts more that forty years ago.34 Since then, a Rule 10b-535
violation has been found in two situations, described as the “fraud by
conduct” theory and the “misstatement or omission” theory.36 Fraud by
conduct exists, as in Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc.37 where the
33. Prudential-Bach Securities, Inc. Exchange Act Release No. 34-22755, 1986 WL 626342, at
*12 (emphasis added) (citing Mauriber v. Shearson American Express, 567 F. Supp. 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
34. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1581.
Suggestions that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may impose a suitability requirement
on broker-dealers not simply as an ethical, but as a legal obligation appeared in a few
early 1960s SEC cases. The SEC reasoned that a violation of the suitability doctrine
may constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5 based upon the shingle theory. When a
broker-dealer hangs out his shingle he impliedly represents, among other things, that
he will recommend securities only if he has a reasonable basis for believing that they
are suited to a customer’s financial circumstances. The SEC utilized this application
of the suitability doctrine incorporated into the shingle theory in a large number of
boiler room cases. The SEC also utilized this application of the suitability doctrine
incorporated into the shingle theory in cases involving intensive selling efforts with
respect to low-priced speculative securities which were not necessarily part of a boiler
room operation. In these earlier cases, a variety of other violations of Rule 10b-5 were
also present, including false or misleading representations regarding the security,
excessive markups, and control or domination of the market.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
36. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, 132 F.3d 1017, 1032 (4th Cir. 1997)
(explaining that while the Court “has never considered an unsuitability claim under § 10(b),
several courts have recognized an unsuitability claim in certain circumstances”).
37. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978). Prof. Poser summarizes
the Lamula facts:
The plaintiff was a retired school teacher with little investment experience or
sophistication, who had received a divorce settlement of $138,000. She told the
defendant broker that she wished to invest $100,000 of the divorce settlement, in
order to obtain an annual yield of $12,000. The broker recommended that the plaintiff
buy certain debentures, and she agreed. The defendant purchased the debentures for
$94,360 and resold them to the plaintiff for $105,250 (a markup of over 11 percent of
the amount actually invested on the plaintiff’s behalf). When the debentures declined
in value, the plaintiff sued under Rule 10b-5, claiming that the debentures were
unsuitable and that the markup charged by the broker was unreasonable. The jury, in
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broker committed fraud by executing an unsuitable trade for a client. On the
other hand, prosecution of a claim under the misstatement or omission is
conceptually similar to most other 10b-5 claims,38 where the broker
misrepresented or omitted the suitability of the recommendation to his
client, because suitability is information that a reasonable investor would
want to have before making an investment decision, as recognized in 1993
by the Second Circuit in Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.39
The Second Circuit was the first federal appeals court, in 1978, to
recognize unsuitability as a violation of Rule 10b-5 in Lamula.40 “Lamula
require[d] that to establish a 10b-5 claim the investor must prove only (1)
that the recommended securities were unsuitable and (2) that the defendant
acted with scienter. Or, put another way, an unsuitability claim is made out
if the trier of fact finds that the recommended securities were unsuited to
the investor’s needs, and that the broker knew or reasonably believed that
[the securities] were unsuitable but recommended the securities to the
plaintiff anyway.”41

response to interrogatories, found that the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff of
the following material facts: (1) how the leading rating services rated the debentures;
(2) that the plaintiff could not expect to receive annual income of $12,000 from a
$100,000 investment unless she bought speculative securities involving great financial
risk; and (3) the extent of the risks involved in purchasing the debentures. The court
concluded that the defendant acted with scienter and that if the plaintiff had been
informed of the omitted facts she would not have purchased the debentures. The
court, however, did not stop with its conclusion that the defendant had ‘omitted to
state facts material to an informed purchase’ by the plaintiff, in violation of subsection
(b) of Rule 10b-5; it also held that the defendant’s intentional recommendation of an
unsuitable security was ‘an act, practice or course of business which operated as a
fraud or deceit’ upon the plaintiff, in violation of subsection (c) of the rule.
POSER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-92.1.
38. Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d. at 1032. A claim for § 10(b) suitability fraud “is a subset of the
ordinary § 10(b) fraud claim.” Id. See also O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty, 965 F.2d 893, 897 (10th
Cir. 1992) (recognizing that this type of suitability claim could be analyzed “simply as a
misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact. In such a case, the broker has omitted
telling the investor the recommendation is unstable for the investor’s interests. The court may then
use traditional laws concerning omission to examine the claim.”).
39. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993); POSER, supra
note 3, § 3.03, at 3-93.
40. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 599–600 (2d Cir. 1978).
41. Poser, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-92.2. The SEC repealed in 1983 a suitability rule
actionable under federal law which applied to broker-dealers who were not members of an SRO.
Former 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 enacted in 1967 and repealed in 1983. Lowenfels, supra note 1,
at 1584. “Every nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person who recommends to a
customer the purchase, sale or exchange of a security shall have reasonable grounds to believe that
the recommendation is not unsuitable for such customer.” Id. “The SECO regulations, including
Rule 15b10-3, were rescinded in 1983 and virtually all broker-dealers were required to join an
SRO and thereby become subject to its rules.” Id.
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1. The Five Elements of a 10b-5 Unsuitability Claim
Under Brown
In Brown, the Second Circuit opinion defined five elements of
unsuitability within the misstatement-omission violations of § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.42 The court stated:
A plaintiff must prove (1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to
the buyer’s needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the
securities were unsuited to the buyer’s needs; (3) that the defendant
recommended or purchased the unsuitable securities for the buyer anyway;
(4) that, with scienter, the defendant made material misrepresentations (or,
owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose material information) relating
to the suitability of the securities; and (5) that the buyer justifiably relied
to its detriment on the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.”43

The first Brown element is the subject of this article, so discussion on
this topic is reserved for later. The second Brown element queries whether
or not the broker knew or should have known that the securities were
unsuitable for the client, 44 requiring a finding of the first element. Thus, the
first two Brown elements hinge on the same subjective reasonable belief
standard.
The third Brown element can generally be proved through documentary
evidence and the records of the clients’ accounts along with the records that
are required to be kept by broker-dealers in conformance with § 17(a) of the
‘34 Act, which include: records of communications with clients, records of
communications about client activities, commission records for the broker
that may show similar transactions in other clients’ accounts (parallel
trading).45 Respondents may show evidence that the claimants engaged in
the same or similar trading in other brokerage accounts as rebuttal
evidence.46 According to the NASD, “a broad range of circumstances may
cause a transaction to be considered recommended,” including both oral and
written communication with a client.47 Although not binding law, SRO

42. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031.
43. Id. (citing Lamula, 583 F.2d at 600–01; National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Woodhead,
917 F.2d 752, 757 (2d Cir. 1990)).
44. See Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 595-596 (2d Cir. 1969) (“Brokers and
salesmen are ‘under a duty to investigate, and their violation of that duty brings them within the
term ‘willful’ in the Exchange Act.’ Thus, a salesman cannot deliberately ignore that which he has
a duty to know and recklessly state facts about matters of which he is ignorant. He must analyze
sales literature and must not blindly accept recommendations made therein.”).
45. The ‘34 Act’s Rule 17a-3 Records to Be Made by Certain Exchange Members, Brokers
and Dealers, requires Broker-Dealers to maintain records of each purchase, sale, call, put, cash
balance, margin balance, etc. for each and every customer and transaction, or communication.
SEC Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (2006).
46. See generally ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-5, at 5-19.
47. NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 96-60, Sept. 1996, at 474.
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Rules may be used in federal courts as evidence of standards of professional
conduct.48
Scienter, the fourth Brown element, “may be inferred by finding that the
defendant knew or reasonably believed that the securities were unsuited to
the investor’s needs, misrepresented or failed to disclose the unsuitability of
the securities, and proceeded to recommend or purchase the securities
anyway.”49 An inability to prove scienter is not a bar, however, because “in
appropriate circumstances recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.”50
“Reckless conduct is, at the least, conduct which is ‘highly unreasonable’
and which represents ‘an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care . . . to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.’”51 Although
some dissension remains, “[b]y 1990, eight Circuit Courts of Appeal had
adopted standards of ‘recklessness’ to support Rule 10b-5 claims.”52 Thus,
the determination of scienter or recklessness also hinges on a finding that
the recommendation was unsuitable.
The fifth Brown element of justifiable reliance contains two
components. First, “[a] plaintiff’s burden with respect to the reliance
element of an unsuitability claim . . . var[ies] depending on whether the
claim alleges fraudulent representations or [] omissions.”53 This reliance
aspect begs comparison between the complexity of the recommended
security and the sophistication of the client, and further with that of the
broker.54 Here it may presumed that an unsophisticated client relied on her
48. Javitch v. First Montauk Fin. Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 931, 938 (D. Ohio 2003); see also
Lange v. H. Heinze & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (NASD rules can be used as
evidence as to standard of care in the industry); Stevenson v. Rochdale Investment Management,
Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13110 at *28-29, 2000 WL 1278479, at *8 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(unpublished opinion) (violation of the rules may be evidence of standard of care).
49. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993).
50. Rolf v. Blyth, 570 F.2d 38, 44–47 (2d Cir. 1978).
51. Id. at 47 (citing Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)).
52. Root, supra note 10, at 316–17.
53. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031 (citing Burke v. Jacoby, 981 F.2d 1372, 1378–79 (2d Cir. 1992)).
54. Id. at 1032.
An investor may not justifiably rely on a misrepresentation if, through minimal
diligence, the investor should have discovered the truth. Under this standard, § 10(b)
liability will not be imposed when an investor’s conduct rises to the level of
recklessness. To determine whether an investor acted recklessly, and therefore
without justifiable reliance, no single factor is dispositive, and all relevant factors
must be considered and balanced. In Royal American we considered the plaintiff’s
sophistication and expertise in finance and in the subject matter of the securities
transaction; the plaintiff’s representation by counsel; the plaintiff’s opportunity to
detect the fraud; whether the fraud was concealed; and the nature of the fraud. This
Court has never established a list of all relevant factors, although many courts have
been guided by the following: (1) The sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in
financial and securities matters; (2) the existence of longstanding business or personal
relationships; (3) access to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship; (5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the fraud; (7)
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broker’s55 recommendation because of the broker’s exposure to
sophisticated investment matters through licensing requirements56 and the
Shingle Theory, which states that by advertising investment services to the
public, a broker-dealer holds itself out as a competent expert in investing.57
The second component of the fifth Brown element requires a showing of
whether the plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the
transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity of the misrepresentations.
Id. (citations omitted).
55. Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 71, 78 (D. Wis. 1972) (“A defendant must exercise a
higher standard of care when he knows or has reason to know that the plaintiff has relied almost
exclusively upon his advice.”).
56. Brokers are required to pass the Series 7 licensing exam to become Registered
Representatives in the sales of securities. NASD.com, Registration and Qualifications - NASD
Registration and Examination Requirements, http://www.nasd.com/RegistrationQualifications/
BrokerGuidanceResponsibility/Qualifications/NASDW_011051. (“This registration qualifies a
candidate for the solicitation, purchase, and/or sale of all securities products, including corporate
securities, municipal securities, municipal fund securities, options, direct participation programs,
investment company products, and variable contracts.”). For further discussion of the scope of
material covered by Registered Representative licensing exam, see Content Outline for the
General Securities Registered Representative Examination (Test Series 7), http://www.nyse.com/
pdfs/series7.pdf.
The Series 7 Examination is the Qualification Examination for General Securities
Registered Representatives. As a qualification examination, it is intended to safeguard
the investing public by helping to ensure that registered representatives are competent
to perform their jobs. Given this purpose, the Series 7 Examination seeks to measure
accurately and reliably the degree to which each candidate possesses the knowledge,
skills and abilities needed to perform the critical functions of a registered
representative (RR). Candidates should note that the duties and functions of the RR
must be performed in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade, federal
and state laws, and industry regulations. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the RR
to be aware of changes in current legislation, regulation and policy. The RR’s primary
responsibility is to the client. When advising the client, the RR must do so fully and
honestly. The RR must make a diligent good-faith effort to obtain essential facts prior
to making appropriate recommendations. Soliciting clients and counseling established
clients are intrinsic duties of an RR, and these tasks must never be performed in a
deceptive or fraudulent manner for any purpose. An RR who violates industry
regulations is subject to disciplinary action, including censures, fines, suspension,
and/or permanent loss of registration.
Id.

57. See Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 596–597 (2d Cir. 1969).
A securities dealer occupies a special relationship to a buyer of securities in that by
his position he implicitly represents he has an adequate basis for the opinions he
renders. While this implied warranty may not be as rigidly enforced in a civil action
where an investor seeks damages for losses allegedly caused by reliance upon his
unfounded representations, n13 its applicability in the instant proceedings cannot be
questioned.
Id. (citing Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961)) (providing approval regarding the
“shingle theory”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“[Shingle theory definition:] The
notion that a broker-dealer must be held to a high standard of conduct because by engaging in the
securities business (‘hanging out a shingle’), the broker-dealer implicitly represents to the world
that the conduct of all its employees will be fair and meet professional norms.”).
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damages, such as the trading losses sustained as a result of the broker’s
recommendation.58 However, a broker-respondent may counter with a
showing that other factors caused all or part of the losses complained of or
that his client failed to mitigate her losses. In a bear market,59 a broker may
use the well-managed account theory of losses60 as a defense by showing,
for example, that the losses suffered in his client’s account were less than
the proportionate declines in broad market indices during the same period.
3. The Suitability of the Recommended Security is the
Focal Issue61
Decisions about whether a recommendation was made, whether reliance
was justifiable, and the broker’s scienter or recklessness may in many cases
be reserved until after the suitability of the investment for the claimant has
been determined. It is practical to reserve such findings because the
existence of a recommendation, scienter, and justifiable reliance may flow
logically from, a finding that the security was unsuitable for the client. For
example, a finding that a thinly traded stock underwritten by the broker’s
firm and traded by the broker’s other clients was unsuitable could be useful
in determining that the recommendation was made with scienter or
recklessness, and that the client justifiably relied on that recommendation.62
58. Recommendations for unsuitable purchases are the most straightforward in terms of
proving damages. It is theoretically possible, but practically far more difficult to prove losses
resulting from an unsuitable recommendation to sell, although Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1972), does show this to be a credible claim in some instances. Other
forms of loss include: margin interest, commissions, and the “well-managed account” theory of
damages which compares the performance of an index to the performance of an account or
investment to determine whether the customer lost more or less than they would have if widely
invested. See Rolf v. Blyth, 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
59. Bear market, ia.com, http://investopedia.com/terms/b/bearmarket.asp (last visited Nov. 21,
2006) [hereinafter Bear Market Definition] (“A market condition in which the prices of securities
are falling or are expected to fall.”).
60. The well-managed account theory can be used in a bear, or declining, market to show that
losses suffered by a client were commensurate with market losses and that the client would have
fared no better, or little better, if invested in broad market indices or mutual funds. See ROBBINS,
supra note 20, § 5-2, at 49–52.
61. Rapp, supra note 29, at 192.
Individual recommendations or a specific recommended strategy are typically
evaluated against an indicated investment objective and financial profile, with liability
determinations flowing from a third-party ex post facto assessment of whether the
characteristics of a particular recommendation comported with the stated objective
and were consistent with the level of “risk” considered appropriate for the investor’s
profile. The focal point becomes the risk characteristics of an individual security
rather than the risk characteristics of a portfolio in which the particular security is
recommended to be a component.
Id. (emphasis added).
62. By way of illustration: At times the complexity or obscurity of an investment
recommendation in and of itself suggests that it may be unsuitable for any but the most
sophisticated investor. Imagine, for example, that a broker executed purchases of “naked calls” in
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Thus, under either Lamula or Brown, the determination as to whether
the security was suitable for the client is both a threshold question and often
the ultimate determining factor.63 Paradoxically, the least guidance is
provided for the determination of whether “the securities purchased were
unsuited to the buyer’s needs.”64
C. WHETHER THE BROKER REASONABLY BELIEVED THAT THE
RECOMMENDED SECURITY WAS SUITABLE FOR THE CUSTOMER
IS THE CURRENT STANDARD, AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT HAS
BEEN FORESTALLED BY ARBITRATION OF SUITABILITY CLAIMS
The subjective standard of reasonable belief of the broker is used to
determine whether a recommendation was suitable under Hanly,65
Lamula,66 and Brown.67 Reasonable belief is too subjective and amorphous
a standard in determining the unsuitability of investment recommendations.68 As stated by Lowenfels and Bromberg in their article Suitability in
Securities Transactions:
The present problem for the industry is that this broad ethical standard
embodying a laundry list of unacceptable activities has become in effect a
quasi-legal standard which forms the basis for the award of private
damages to customers against brokers in arbitration. In practical reality—
in part because securities industry arbitration panels normally do not
render reasoned decisions in writing, in part because an approach of
equitable fairness rather than strict legal doctrine drives these arbitration
small-cap company prior to rumor of take-over bid for the account of an unsophisticated investor
approaching retirement age. In this situation, the obscurity of the company, the sophistication and
market knowledge required to make such a selection, and the investment-type all suggest that a
person educated in making investment decisions would have formed the idea to make that
investment.
63. Exceptions to this statement include dismissal of the claim for failure to plead with
specificity, or disposal for lack of recommendation, reliance, or damages. See DeBruyne v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y, 920 F.2d 457, 465–466 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[A]llegations as to . . . risk
and volatility . . . appear more likely to raise a genuine issue of fact as to mis-representation,” but
dismissing securities claim for other reasons”).
64. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993).
65. Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) (“In summary, the
standards by which the actions of each petitioner must be judged are strict. He cannot recommend
a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for such recommendation. He must
disclose facts which he knows and those which are reasonably ascertainable. By his
recommendation he implies that a reasonable investigation has been made and that his
recommendation rests on the conclusions based on such investigation. Where the salesman lacks
essential information about a security, he should disclose this as well as the risks which arise from
his lack of information.”).
66. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600–601 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Mr. Lamula,
therefore, was required to have reasonable grounds to believe that the securities sold were suitable
for [his client].”). “The jury specifically found that the debentures were unsuited to appellee’s
needs, that appellant Lamula knew or reasonably believed they were unsuitable, but that he
recommended them to her anyway.” Id.
67. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031.
68. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1557.
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panels, and in part because there is no effective right of appeal from the
decisions of arbitration panels—the exposure of the industry to private
damages for violations of NASD suitability rules has expanded in
exponential fashion.69

“Ultimately, suitability rules require only good faith assessments by
brokers,”70 but subjective, amorphous standards lead to uncertainty and to
inefficient application of the law. Similarly, it is difficult and expensive for
the industry, and its customers, to apply and expect a standard which is so
amorphous. This is especially true as common law respondeat superior
liability is compounded by statutorily defined duties which require brokerdealers to design procedures and compliance guidelines and supervise
broker conduct.71
The lack of new cases which would further develop a standard for
unsuitable recommendation liability is due, at least in part, to the fact that
almost all unsuitability claims are heard in arbitration.72 The reason for this
result is that arbitration awards do not have precedential value and tend not
to contain instructional analyses of law or facts. Further, “the bounds of a
broker’s suitability responsibility are . . . left for largely intuitive
determination by panels comprised of individuals having widely disparate
legal and finance backgrounds, and whose charge expressly includes ‘wide
latitude in their interpretation of legal concepts’ involved in matters put
before them.”73
69. Id. at 1567.
70. Rapp, supra note 29, at 258–60.
Larry Ira Klein illustrates that the examination of good faith begins with the process
whereby an investment objective is identified and the risk associated with it is then
assessed. In Larry Ira Klein, the expected return of high yield debt securities was
significantly greater than the certificates of deposit or tax-deferred retirement funds in
which customers’ funds had previously been invested. Still, as the SEC opined, it was
decidedly unreasonable to conclude that the commensurate risk of a portfolio
constructed to achieve that return was suitable. It did not help that the broker was also
found to have materially misled his customers concerning the degree of risk actually
involved.
Id.

71. ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-6f (Failure to Supervise); see also Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t (Supp. II 2002).
72. Renee Barnett, Online Trading And The National Association Of Securities Dealers’
Suitability Rule: Are Online Investors Adequately Protected?, 49 AM U.L. REV. 1089, 1104
(2000) (“Second, virtually all brokers require customers to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements
prior to opening a brokerage account. By entering into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement,
customers waive their right to commence judicial proceedings against their broker and instead
must settle disputes through arbitration.”).
73. Rapp, supra note 29, at 191–192. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1584–85 (“[W]ith this shift
in the legal basis for unsuitability claims has come a shift in the legal elements that must be
proven to establish a suitability violation, from fraud under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 which requires scienter (or at a minimum recklessness) to a nebulous quasi-legal, quasiethical test for breaches of standards of duty and care under SRO rules which does not require
scienter or recklessness.”).
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Changes proposed by the NASD may increase the instructional value of
arbitrators’ awards: “The purpose of the proposed rule change is to amend
the Code of Arbitration Procedure . . . to provide written explanations in
arbitration awards upon the request of customers, or of associated persons
in industry controversies.”74
Federal courts continue to adhere to the Brown elements, as in Louros
v. Kreicas75 where the court stated that “[a] plaintiff asserting such a claim
must prove: (1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer’s
needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities
were unsuited to the buyer’s needs . . . .”76 The Louros court described the
continuing relevance of Brown because, although it
does not mention loss causation[,] Brown [] was rendered before the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act codified the causation
requirement for Section 10(b) cases. In any case, Brown does require that
“the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment on the defendant’s fraudulent
conduct.” This element comprehends a requirement of causation, and with
it the jurisprudence on loss causation in securities fraud cases. 77

The lack of an objective standard for determining suitability under SRO
Rules continues to be problematic under federal securities laws.78 Court
challenges to arbitration awards in suitability claims are largely ineffective,
at least partly because manifest disregard for the law is the standard for
vacating an arbitration panel’s award.79 Thus, to vacate an award, a court
must find that the panel manifestly disregarded the law when it found,
based on a subjective standard, that a broker had a reasonable belief that his

74. On submission to SEC, the NASD is proposing to codify this policy in NASD Rules of the
Association Rule 10330(i).
75. Louros v. Kreicas, 367 F. Supp. 2d 572, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
76. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 592.
78. GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2003) (“GMS neither points
this court to case law interpreting the terms ‘recommendation’ or ‘suitability,’ nor points to
anywhere in the record where such law was brought to the attention of the arbitrators.”).
79. Id.; Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002).
An arbitration award may be vacated if it exhibits a “manifest disregard of the law.”
Given the deference afforded arbitration decisions, this standard requires more than a
mistake of law or a clear error in fact finding. Manifest disregard can be established
only where a governing legal principle is ‘well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable to the case,’ and where the arbitrator ignored it after it was brought to the
arbitrator’s attention in a way that assures that the arbitrator knew its controlling
nature. An arbitrator (even an arbitrator who is a lawyer) is often selected for
expertise in the commercial aspect of the dispute or for trustworthiness, rather than for
knowledge of the applicable law, and under the test of manifest disregard is ordinarily
assumed to be a blank slate unless educated in the law by the parties.
Id. (citations omitted).
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recommendation was suitable for his customer. The result is a dearth of
meaningful reviews of arbitration awards. 80
II. THE SUITABILITY STANDARD SHOULD BE OBJECTIVE AND
WEIGH THE RISK OF A BROKER’S RECOMMENDATION
AGAINST THE CLIENT’S APPROPRIATE RISK LEVEL
An objective standard is necessary to judge the suitability of a broker’s
recommendation to his client. Currently, brokers are required to make their
suitability determinations based on objective measures in order to establish
a reasonable belief. Rational thought is required to make a reasoned
determination, and “[t]he broker’s suitability obligation does not rest on
intuition, it rests on a formal statistical process.”81 Under the shingle theory,
it can be expected that brokers will use finance theory in assessing the
suitability of securities for their clients.82 Among the many tools available
to brokers, “Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) is a set of formulas used to
determine, objectively, whether a portfolio is suitable for a particular
client’s objectives and circumstances.”83
An objective measure is also needed to guide broker-dealers and to
protect investors. In fact, “it is essential that there be a suitability paradigm
within which stockbrokers may comfortably operate and against which their
professionalism may fairly be evaluated in the face of a challenge. That is
not the case today.”84 The SEC has supported some objective standards in
determining suitability in disciplinary settings, including inadvisable
concentration of a client’s assets in the stock of one company, especially if

80. Here the primary trier of fact is an arbitration panel, although a panel’s “award,” as a
panel’s decision is known in arbitration, is subject to review by courts. The standard of review is
“manifest disregard for the law” and is infrequently found in client-broker claims. Arbitration
awards are “vacated” upon a motion for vacature by a party to the arbitration. Telephone interview
with Professor Marcella Silverman of Fordham Law School (Sept. 2006). An unpublished
Fordham Law School study found only one such award was vacated in New York in the last
twenty years. Id.
81. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 199.
82. For information on the Series 7 exam, see supra note 56.
83. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 173. The Second Circuit has also made reference to objective
measures in affirming a finding of unsuitability in Lamula when “the jury found that Lamula
failed to inform [the client] . . . how the leading rating services rated the debentures.” Clark v.
John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 599 (2d Cir. 1978).
84. Rapp, supra note 29, at 262–63 could be characterized to disagree with some propositions
of this article. The article explains that:
‘Suitability rules’ set ethical conduct expectations, but articulate no standard of care
against which portfolio oriented recommendations of brokers can be adequately and
fairly judged. This is not to say that there should, or could, be a litmus test for judging
broker conduct. Wooden notions of any sort cannot suffice to articulate a standard of
care in a world populated by such a vast array of investment opportunities and risks
and the many and varied strategies for their use.
Id.
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that stock is “speculative”. In affirming an NASD disciplinary ruling,
evidence was presented in that:
[Broker] Faber recommended that [his Client] McKinzie purchase
approximately $52,000 of Interbet shares. These funds constituted nearly
all of her SC portfolio and more than two-thirds of her total liquid assets.
Interbet had no revenues and had never showed any profits. Moreover,
[Broker] Faber recommended that [his Client] McKinzie concentrate her
entire portfolio at SC in one speculative security. This concentration
created a substantial risk that [his Client] McKinzie could lose all, or
virtually all, of her account balance. We have repeatedly found that high
concentration of investments in one or a limited number of speculative
securities is not suitable for investors seeking limited risk.85

A. MOST UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS ARE BROUGHT BY INDIVIDUAL
INVESTORS UNDER NASD RULE 2310, TO RECOVER PRINCIPAL
LOST IN COMMON STOCK INVESTMENTS
The overwhelming majority of unsuitability claims are arbitrated due to
the enforcement of the arbitration clauses contained in almost every account
opening document86 signed between an investor and her broker.87 The
enforceability of these clauses was assured by two Supreme Court
decisions, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon88 in 1987 and
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express89 in 1989, which

85. In the Matter of the Application of DANE S. FABER, 10 Libertyship Way # 4133,
Sausalito, California 94965, For Review of Disciplinary Action Taken by, NASD, 2004 SEC
LEXIS 277, at *25–26 (SEC 2004) (citations omitted).
86. See Barnett, supra note 73 (“[V]irtually all brokers require customers to sign pre-dispute
arbitration agreements prior to opening a brokerage account.”).
87. The account opening document is a contract between the customer-investor and the
broker/dealer, and defines the respective rights and obligations of the parties, the inclusion of a
pre-dispute agreement to arbitration is governed by NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R.
3110(f) and NYSE RULES R. 637, and require significant disclosures as to the implications of
arbitration and the procedural distinctions from a court action. See generally ROBBINS, supra
note 20, § 2-3.
88. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (“The Arbitration Act
thus establishes a ‘federal policy favoring arbitration,’ requiring that ‘we rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate.’”) (internal citations omitted).
89. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
Once the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings is set to one
side, it becomes clear that the right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice of
courts are not such essential features of the Securities Act that § 14 is properly
construed to bar any waiver of these provisions. Nor are they so critical that they
cannot be waived under the rationale that the Securities Act was intended to place
buyers of securities on an equal footing with sellers. Wilko identified two different
kinds of provisions in the Securities Act that would advance this objective. Some are
substantive, such as the provision placing on the seller the burden of proving lack of
scienter when a buyer alleges fraud.
Id.
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upheld application of the Federal Arbitration Act as it pertained to securities
claims brought under the Securities Act of 193390 (‘33 Act) or the ‘34 Act.91
The choice of arbitration fora available to investors depends upon the
language in the account opening contract. The most common securities
arbitration fora are: NASD Dispute Resolution,92 New York Stock
Exchange Dispute Resolution/Arbitration,93 and the American Arbitration
Association.
The NASD hears 90% of all investor-broker arbitration cases,94
including suitability claims. Between January 1, 2001 and October 31,
2005, 55% of NASD claims involved common stock.95 Unsuitability claims
90. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to
77bbbb).
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a to 78mm). See also Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1558.
Following the dictates of the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark decisions of
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, and Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., the principal forum where customer damage claims
for unsuitability are heard has shifted within the last decade from the courts to
arbitration, primarily the arbitration tribunals provided by the NASD. Additionally,
the specific provisions relied upon by customers pursuing unsuitability claims in these
arbitration forums have shifted within this past decade from the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities laws, primarily section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act, which mandate a legal standard of intent to defraud or recklessness, to the
unsuitability rules of the self-regulatory organizations (SROs), primarily NASD Rule
2310, which embody a comparatively nebulous, quasi-legal, quasi-ethical standard of
due care and fair dealing between brokers and customers. This shift in forum and in
governing standards has eased meaningfully the customer’s path to recovery and
consequently has increased the customer’s leverage to compel a significant
settlement.
Id.

92. “NASD operates the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry to assist in
the resolution of monetary and business disputes between and among investors, securities firms,
and individual registered representatives.” NASD.com, Arbitration & Mediation, http://www.na
sd.com/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006); “NASD ranks by far the
most active forum today, administering 90% or more of the [brokerage industry] cases filed each
year.” ROBBINS, supra note 20, at app. N, 1.
93. New York Stock Exchange arbitration is described on the NYSE website.
For more than 125 years, the NYSE has used arbitration to resolve disputes between
investors and brokers. Arbitration enables a dispute to be resolved quickly and fairly
by impartial arbitrators, who are knowledgeable and trained in the art of resolving
controversy. When a customer chooses arbitration to resolve the dispute, he waives
the right to pursue the matter in court. Arbitration is final and binding.
NYSE Group, Inc., Dispute Resolution/Arbitration, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/dispute
resolution/1089312755623.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
94. NASD.com,
Arbitration
&
Mediation—What
is
Dispute
Resolution,
http://www.nasd.com/ArbitrationMediation/NASDDisputeResolution/WhatisDisputeResolution/in
dex.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
95. See NASD.com, NASD Dispute Resolution Statistics, Summary Arbitration Statistics
October 2006, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&nodeId=516&ss
SourceNodeId=12.
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before NASD arbitrators are very frequent, in fact, 11,718 such claims were
filed between January 1, 2001 and October 31, 2005,96 making unsuitability
one of the most common civil claims in securities.97 Thus, discussion of a
suitability standard for common stock recommendations to individual
investors under NASD Rule 2310 would be applicable to a very high
proportion of unsuitability clams.
In determining whether a broker’s recommendation was suitable for an
investor, the issue should be restated as: “Whether the level of risk inherent
in the recommendation was greater than the appropriate level of risk for the
investor.” Thus, two separate sub-issues present themselves: the level of
risk inherent in the recommendation and the appropriate level of risk for the
investor (e.g., whether investors assume market risk when entering the
securities markets).
The risk that an investor will lose her invested principal is central to
determining a suitability claim. When the risk of investing in a security is
excessive for an investor, recommendation of that security is unsuitable for
that investor.98 This is not the only reason that a recommendation may be
unsuitable, but practically, it is the loss of principal which drives investors
to take action against their brokers.99 “A broker may assure a client that the
broker will only make ‘safe’ investments, and then spend the client’s
money on extremely risky securities, which lose value; in such cases, the
client is harmed when the concealed risk—the volatility of the actual
investments—lowers the value of her portfolio.”100
Most unsuitability cases discuss risk, for the simple reasons that: 1)
damages claimed or losses actually realized by the claimant did have a level
of risk at the time of recommendation; 2) that the gravamen of an
unsuitability claim is whether the amount of risk at the time of
recommendation was suitable for the investor; and 3) whether the broker
knew or should have known of that risk and its suitability for the
investor.101
Risk of loss is the foundation of an unsuitability claim because brokers
may only make recommendations if they have a reasonable basis for the
belief that the recommended security is suitable for their client. “As a retail

96. Id.
97. Because “[e]ach case can be coded to contain up to four controversy types,” the quantity of
claims relative to each other is somewhat uncertain, as many claimants bring multiple claims. At
least a third of the NASD arbitration filings have contained claims of unsuitable recommendations
during the 2002 to 2005 period. Id.
98. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1595 (“In Aaron v. Paine Webber, Inc., the brokerage
firm was ordered to pay its seventy-one-year-old customer, a former art supplies dealer, $500,000
in damages for failing to ‘take reasonable steps to limit or otherwise safeguard the extent of [the
customer’s] risks and possible losses.’”).
99. Id.
100. In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 303, (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
101. See, e.g., Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969).
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brokerage industry observer has counseled: ‘Almost nothing is more
important than understanding a client’s risk tolerance. How well will this
person weather the ups and downs—especially the downs—of the market?
Is the client’s idea of safety having aggressive growth investments with
some market timing mixed in? Or money under the mattress?’”102 Thus, a
broker can be liable for making an unsuitable recommendation if the risk of
loss is too great for a particular client, and the broker knew or should have
known of that risk.103
B. IDENTIFYING AND QUANTIFYING THE RISK OF A
RECOMMENDATION
The risk component of a suitability claim is related to the volatility of a
given security’s price. The risk of loss is greater in investments that have a
higher degree of volatility,104 as explained in In re Merrill Lynch & Co.
Research Reports Securities Litigation where the court cited a document
stating that certain types of “securities ‘historically have been very volatile’
which ‘increases the risk that the securities may lose value.’”105 That court
also noted that “smaller companies . . . ‘may be less financially secure than
larger, more established companies,’ and that as a result ‘such companies
may be subject to abrupt or erratic price movements and more unpredictable
price changes than the stock market as a whole.’”106 This is why “[l]egal
approaches are concerned exclusively with risk of loss.”107
“Inadequate (or fraudulent) advice on risks is the gravamen of
complaints about unsuitability. . . . Hence risk analysis and suitability are
inextricably linked.”108 Therefore, “if a broker cannot make any estimate of
102. Rapp, supra note 29, at 276.
103. Perry v. Markman Capital Mgmt., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19103 (E.D. Pa. 2002). (“First,
[plaintiffs] allege that they told defendants on numerous occasions that the assets under Markman
Capital’s management constituted their entire life savings. Second, Markman Capital was aware
that capital needed to be preserved for plaintiffs’ retirements, which explained their desire for
conservative investments with low risk and moderate volatility as set forth in the agreements.
Finally, plaintiffs aver that defendants never informed them of the risks involved in the type of
trading that defendants conducted with plaintiffs’ accounts.”).
104. Suitability claims require damages. There are few exceptional cases which claim as
damages underperformance. Almost all suitability claims have a loss of principal as damages.
Therefore, the assessment of suitability begins with a loss, and looks back to whether or not that
loss was foreseeable at the time of recommendation. Because a degree of risk is inherent in any
investment, the issue is usually reformed as whether the risk of loss of principal was greater than
what was appropriate for the investor at the time she made the purchase.
105. In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 247
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
106. Id.
107. Rapp, supra note 29, at 261.
108. Root, supra note 10, at 352 (emphasis added). Id. at 351–52 (“Inadequate (or fraudulent)
advice on risks is the gravamen of complaints about unsuitability (i) by institutional investors
taken over by the RTC, (ii) by so-called sophisticated investors in government securities, (iii) in
actions arising under the federal securities laws and commodities laws, (iv) in federal diversity
and state court actions.”).
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the risk and expected returns associated with a given security, then he
clearly lacks an adequate basis for evaluating its prospects and so is
prohibited by the ‘shingle theory’ from ever recommending so-called
uncertain investments.”109 Thus, this risk that brokers must assess in
forming a reasoned belief as to the suitability of a recommendation can be
objectively quantified.
Thus, quantification of the risk inherent in a recommendation can lead
to an objective standard for determining the suitability of a recommendation
made by a broker to his client.110 Further, recommendation risk can be
quantified with a simple mathematical calculation using two measures
accessible to brokers. Beta (β) is a measurement of the volatility of a
specific security relative to the securities market generally. The volatility of
an investment is increased proportionally by the use of borrowed funds
(leverage), thereby magnifying the effect of a security’s losses and gains in
value. The risk level of a recommendation can be calculated by dividing the
recommended security’s beta by the equity ratio of the recommendation
(the percentage of equity of a security position). The resulting number is the
“Risk Quotient.”
“An accurate determination of beta is the most important single element
in predicting the future behavior of a portfolio.”111 Beta is “[a] measure of
[a security’s or portfolio’s] volatility, or systematic risk, in comparison to
the market as a whole.”112 “Although [beta] is the product of arcane analysis
of historic data, beta information for [almost all exchange] traded securities
is easily accessed by investors and investment professionals alike.”113
Because “[r]etail stockbrokers have the resources to make, or at least fairly
estimate, the needed determinations in regard to particular
recommendations”114 it is reasonable to use beta information in determining

109. Neil B. Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L. J. 1604,
1607–08 (1971).
110. The NASD supports this theory as well, as it told its members in a Fall 1998 Regulatory
Short Take on Suitability Issues.
When considering “suitability,” one often thinks in terms of a customer’s financial
status, investment background, and investment objectives. It is equally important to
consider the factors relevant to the security and/or product being recommended.
Before making any recommendation, the firm should perform adequate due diligence
to ascertain essential facts such as financial status of issuer, degree of risk, maturity
date, and withdrawal penalties. It is important that suitability standards be reviewed
with each and every trade.
NASD, REGULATORY & COMPLIANCE ALERT 13 (Sept. 1998) (emphasis added).
111. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 196.
112. Beta, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/beta.asp (last visited Nov.
14, 2006) [hereinafter Beta Definition].
113. Rapp, supra note 29, at 252
114. Id. at 251–52.
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whether or not a recommendation was suitable, or at least whether a broker
had a basis for a reasonable belief that the recommendation was suitable.115
Beta is calculated by comparing the historic fluctuation of a security’s
price relative to changes in the market as a whole.116 If a security has a beta
lower than 1.00, that security’s historic price has been less volatile than the
overall market over the same period. A beta higher than 1.00 signifies that
security’s price has been more volatile than the market. “For example, if a
stock’s beta is 1.2 it’s theoretically 20% more volatile than the market.”117
The Standard & Poor 500 index (S&P 500) is “the [most popular, but not
only] standard for calculating beta . . . where the S&P 500 has a beta equal
to 1.00.”118
Volatility is “a statistical measure of the tendency of a market or
security to rise or fall sharply within a period of time.”119 “Volatility is
typically calculated by using variance or annualized standard deviation of
the price or return. . . . A highly volatile market means that prices have huge
swings in very short periods of time.”120 Standard deviation is a statistical
measure “of the dispersion of a set of data from its mean. The more spread
apart the data is, the higher the deviation. . . . A volatile stock would have a
high standard deviation.”121 Standard deviation is symbolized by the Greek
letter sigma (σ). Sigma squared (σ2) is beta.

115. See Central Nat’l Bank v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 901–02 (7th Cir.
1990). In Central, Circuit Judge Posner recognized beta as a quantification of investment risk. Id.
116. “Beta is calculated using regression analysis, and you can think of beta as the tendency of
a security’s returns to respond to swings in the market. A beta of 1 indicates that the security’s
price will move with the market.” Beta Definition, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. The Major American Equity Indices, http://www.benbest.com/business/indexusa.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2006).
The S&P 500 is intended to be comprised of the 500 biggest [publicly]-traded
companies in the United States by market capitalization (in contrast to the FORTUNE
500, which are the largest 500 companies in terms of sales revenue). Although the
general principle for calculating the S&P 500 Index on the basis of market
capitalization of the largest 500 companies is simple, the details can be
complex. . . . The S&P 500 Index comprises about three-quarters of total American
capitalization. In 2001, forty of the S&P 500 stocks provided half of the Index’s total
market cap. In 1999, nine of the S&P 500 stocks provided half of the Index’s total
return. Most money managers treat the S&P 500 as a proxy for the US stock market.
Three-quarters of money in American index funds is tied to the S&P 500. Analysts
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) use the S&P 500 as a proxy for the
stock market . . . .
Id.

119. RealNetworks, Inc., Glossary (V), http://investor.realnetworks.com/glossary.cfm?First
Letter=v (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
120. Volatility, TheFreeDictionary.com, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Volatility (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
121. Standard Deviation, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/standard
deviation.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
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These measurements are used in financial analysis to determine the
value of risk, which is defined as “the chance that an investment’s actual
return will be different than expected.122 This includes the possibility of
losing some or all of the original investment. It is usually measured using
the historical returns or average returns for a specific investment.”123 As is
commonly understood, “[h]igher risk means a greater opportunity for high
returns... and a higher potential for loss.”124
There are several types of risk associated with securities investment,
which can be categorized into one of two types: “Systematic Risk” and
“Unsystematic Risk.” Systematic Risk is “[t]he risk inherent to the entire
market or entire market segment. [It is a]lso known as ‘un-diversifiable
risk’ or ‘market risk’”125 because the entire market is susceptible to this type
of risk and no strategy of diversification can protect an investor from a
global market decline. Thus, this is a type of risk that cannot be avoided by
any investor, and therefore is not compensated for.126
Unsystematic Risk is “[r]isk that affects a very small number of assets.
Sometimes referred to as specific risk.”127 This type of risk affects individual securities or investment sectors, “[f]or example, news that is specific to
a small number of stocks, such as a sudden strike by the employees of a
company,”128 or the dramatic negative effect of increasing fuel prices on
airlines’ stocks, as opposed corresponding increase to the shares of oil
drilling supply companies.
122. See Risk-Return Tradeoff, Investopedia.com, http://investopedia.com/terms/r/riskreturn
tradeoff.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
Risk-Return Tradeoff [Definition:] The principle that potential return rises with an
increase in risk. Low levels of uncertainty (low risk) are associated with low potential
returns, whereas high levels of uncertainty (high risk) are associated with high
potential returns. In other words, the risk-return tradeoff says that invested money can
render higher profits only if it is subject to the possibility of being lost. [Example:]
Because of the risk-return tradeoff, you must be aware of your personal risk tolerance
when choosing investments for your portfolio. Taking on some risk is the price of
achieving returns; therefore, if you want to make money, you can’t cut out all risk.
The goal instead is to find an appropriate balance - one that generates some profit, but
still allows you to sleep at night.
Id.

123. Risk, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/risk.asp (last visited Nov.
14, 2006).
124. Id.
125. Systematic Risk, Investopedia.com, http://www.investop–edia.com/terms/s/systematic
risk.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
126. Id. (“Interest rates, recession and wars all represent sources of systematic risk because they
will affect the entire market and cannot be avoided through diversification. Whereas this type of
risk affects a broad range of securities, unsystematic risk affects a very specific group of securities
or an individual security. Systematic risk can be mitigated only by being hedged. Even a portfolio
of well diversified assets cannot escape all risk.”).
127. Unsystematic Risk, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unsystematic
risk.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
128. Id.
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Brokers have a duty to disclose these types of risk to investors,
especially when there are specific risks inherent in particular investment
types and, especially, in specific securities.129 Among the many rules
requiring such disclosure are NASD Rule 2310130 and NYSE Rule 405.131
Case law elaborates that a broker must inform a client of the risks of an
investment.132 Measuring the recommendation risk of an individual
security, the broker must take that security’s volatility or beta into account
to determine whether it may be suitable for the investor at the time he
makes such a recommendation.133
Another component in quantifying the risk inherent in a recommenddation is the leverage or “margin”134 recommended in purchasing such a
security, as leverage will increase the volatility of a position.135 “[T]he

129. See Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich.
1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981).
130
NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310.
131
NYSE RULES R. 405.
132. A broker’s failure to conduct a proper investigation and to inform a potential purchaser of
its findings could in itself be a basis for liability under 10b-5. Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D.
71, 77 (D. Wis. 1972); see also Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969).
133. See Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1986), discussing the
need for comparison in determinations of churning or suitability.
Suitability is apparent only by comparison with other possible investments. To
determine whether the investments are suitable, one must know the spectrum of
possible investments to which the ones in issue are compared. The significance of
statistical measurements of account activity, such as the turnover rate, is apparent only
in comparison to activity in other accounts. If an expert is not allowed to testify that
given statistics evidence excessive trading, the jury is left with meaningless numbers
from which they cannot judge the appropriateness of the transactions.
Id. (emphasis added).
134. See Margin, Investopedia.com, http://investopedia.com/terms/m/margin.asp (last visited
Nov. 14, 2006). Definitions of “margin: 1. Borrowed money that is used to purchase securities.
This practice is referred to as ‘buying on margin’. 2. The amount of equity contributed by a
customer as a percentage of the current market value of the securities held in a margin account.”
Examples include:
1.

Buying with borrowed money can be extremely risky because both gains and
losses are amplified. That is, while the potential for greater profit exists, this
comes at a hefty price—the potential for greater losses. Margin also subjects the
investor to a number of unique risks such as interest payments for use of the
borrowed money.

2.

For example, if you hold futures contracts in a margin account, you have to
maintain a certain amount of margin depending on how the market value of the
contracts change.

Id.

135. NASD Dept. of Enforcement v. Raghavan Sathianathan, 2004 NASD Discip. LEXIS 55,
60–61 (NASD Discip. 2004) (“Sathianathan did so because he used margin and options trading in
his clients’ accounts without consideration of the suitability of those strategies for his customers.
This is a grave departure from the standards governing his duty to ensure that his
recommendations are suitable for his customers.”).
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extent to which the broker used margin was unsuitably risky” for the
investor.136 The amount of margin affects suitability because a drop in the
recommended security’s price will affect the value of the position
attributable to both the portion owned with the investor’s own funds and
also the portion controlled with borrowed funds.
There are two distinct types of recommendations that may occur in a
broker-client relationship: the recommendation of an individual security (or
securities) and the recommendation of an individual security (or securities)
in the context of allocating the assets of a portfolio. When measuring the
recommendation risk of a security in the context of a portfolio, the broker
must take into account the weighted average beta of the portfolio (portfolio
beta)137 and what the impact of the recommendation will be on the portfolio
beta at the time he makes a recommendation as to whether it may be
suitable for the investor. Thus, a broker who makes recommendations based
on a portfolio approach must take ongoing measures of the portfolio’s
volatility into consideration, and may recommend adjusting components’
weights or adding more or less volatile securities to achieve the best
distribution for the investor.138
136. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1577–78.
In In re Rangen, the broker recommended that three unsophisticated, inexperienced
investors, two of them elderly and all with limited means, concentrate their
investments in margin purchases of non-income-producing U.S. Treasury (STRIP)
securities and speculative over-the-counter securities. These recommendations were
subsequently adjudged unsuitable on three grounds. First, the recommendations were
unsuitable because the customers were “seeking safe, income-producing investments
and did not wish to speculate.” Second, the extent to which the broker used margin
was unsuitably risky for inexperienced customers seeking to generate additional
income through their investments. Third, the concentration of so much of the
customers’ equity in particular securities “increased the risk of loss . . . beyond what
is consistent with the objective of safe non-speculative investing.”
Id.

137. The beta of a portfolio can be measured by multiplying the weight, or percentage, of each
portfolio component by its individual beta and adding the weighted betas of each component. For
example, Pfizer common stock, accounts for 50% of a given portfolio’s value, Google common
stock, accounts for 25% of that portfolio’s value, and the remaining 25% in Microsoft common
stock. If Pfizer’s beta was 0.8 x 50% = 0.4; Google’s beta that day is 1.6 x 25% = 0.4; and
Microsoft’s beta that day is 1.2 x 25% = 0.3, the portfolio beta would equal 0.4 + 0.4 + 0.3 = 1.1,
or 10% more volatile than the S&P 500.
138. The broker in a non-fiduciary capacity is under no overt duty to monitor the performance
or volatility of the portfolio, but only to make recommendations that are suitable at the time that
they make them. Therefore a Broker, who claims to use the portfolio approach, will be bound to
re-assess the volatility each of the existing components when making any further
recommendations. See generally Rapp, supra note 29, at 271 (“Only after the suitability of
risk/return parameters is established does it matter what recommendations for the construction of
or addition to a portfolio are made. At that point, however, the stand-alone characteristics of a
particular recommendation matter only as to the contribution of the asset to the performance of the
portfolio, which now has its own risk/return profile. A recommended asset which adds to the
efficiency of the portfolio, i.e., one which moves the entire portfolio to maximum return
associated with the established risk level of the portfolio, or which is made in order to maintain
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C. RISK QUOTIENT (RQ)
The Risk Quotient measures the volatility of a particular investment or
portfolio at the time of recommendation by taking the relative volatility and
the leverage of the position both into account.139 These two measures are
easily identified by the broker140 and are significant factors in making any
investment decision because leverage proportionally impacts the beta’s
volatility measure. RQ is calculated by dividing the beta of the individual
security by the equity percentage recommended (RQ = β ÷ equity %). The
equity percentage is calculated as 100 percent less the percentage of loan
recommended to make the purchase. Thus, β is the numerator and the
equity percentage is the denominator. The resulting RQ reflects the impact
of “leverage,” as the use of borrowed funds amplifies the risk inherent in
any investment.
For example: A broker recommended American International Group
common stock, listed as AIG on the NYSE, on December 5, 2005 when it
had a beta of 0.79. The broker recommended that the purchase be made
with one-half cash and one-half borrowed funds from the broker’s firm,
yielding an equity percentage of 50%. The RQ formula would be 0.79 ÷
50% = 1.58. Thus, the recommendation of AIG, a stock less volatile than
the S&P 500 by 21% (where the beta of the S&P 500 is 1.0),141 is rendered
58% more volatile than the S&P 500 by the use of leverage.
If a broker is recommending a change to a position or positions within a
portfolio, reassessment of the existing portfolio components is required for
the RQ to be meaningful.142 Because “[s]uitability… is an ongoing

maximum return without altering overall risk characteristics, should not be open to challenge on
the basis of the individual risk characteristics.”).
139. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 177–78 (“The correlation of a stock with the stock market as a
whole is called the beta of the stock. The beta of each stock in the portfolio is then used to
determine the overall risk of the portfolio. The level of risk produced is supposed to correspond to
the level of risk the customer stated he or she wanted in the investment portfolio. This is the factor
that makes the portfolio ‘suitable’ or not ‘suitable’ for a particular investor. In suitability claims,
the basis of the lawsuit is that the portfolio was not suitable for the investor’s stated
objective(s).”).
140. The typical data sheet for any common stock will have a three year beta calculated versus
the S&P 500. Additionally, beta information is available through Bloomberg™ terminals,
financial websites such as finance.yahoo.com, and analysts’ reports; see also Rapp, supra note 9,
at 251–52 (“[A]vail to retail brokers and investors alike. . . .”),
141. See supra note 119.
142. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 195 (“Whatever the general risk preferences of the investor,
within a diversified portfolio there should be both risky and risk-free investments. Through
diversification, the portfolio eliminates the non-systematic risks of component securities and
leaves only an identifiable, but accepted, level of systematic risk associated with the expected
return of the portfolio. . . . Conversely, such a portfolio will have the minimum risk at the desired
level of expected return.”).
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obligation [the broker-dealer may be liable if it] failed to maintain any
ongoing supervision of the Claimant’s suitability.”143
A portfolio’s RQ is the weighted average RQ of each component, with
existing components reassessed at the time of recommendation at the thencurrent beta144 and then-current equity percentage.145 A broker who
undertakes such analysis would have a defense to a claim of unsuitability as
he would have used a portfolio approach to client recommendations. The
broker would have known the portfolio’s level of risk and would have been
able to manage the amount of risk his client was exposed to.
D. THE CLIENT’S APPROPRIATE RISK LEVEL (CARL) SHOULD BE
THE BASIS OF COMPARISON TO THE RECOMMENDATION RISK146
As part of the Know Your Customer duties, a Broker must determine
what level of risk is appropriate for the client before making any
recommendations.147 To appropriately determine his client’s CARL, a
broker is required under NASD Rule 2310(b) to “make reasonable efforts to
obtain information concerning:
(1) the customer’s financial status;
(2) the customer’s tax status;
(3) the customer’s investment objectives; and
(4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by such
member or registered representative in making recommendations to the
customer.”148
“Such other information” may include: 1) the client’s age, as it may be indicative of the amount of time that she will hold the investments
contemplated, or when the principal amount invested may be needed to
sustain her or provide income; 2) the client’s employment or other income
143. Peterzell v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 88-02868, 1991 WL 202358 *2 (N.A.S.D. 1991).
See also Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1594 (discussing “dram shop” cases).
144. See Reinsch, supra note 10, at 196 n.111 (“The beta of an individual component is subject
to change over time, as an earnings report or other news may put unsystematic pressure on a
company’s securities and drive it away from market trends.”).
145. The equity percentage of a component is subject to change over time, as the rise in a
component’s value will increase the equity percentage and conversely, a decrease in value will
decrease the equity percentage.
146. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 193 (“The broker must ensure that the investor’s risk profile is
given due consideration in terms of the beta of the portfolio. The most common violations by a
broker are recommendations or purchases of securities that are not suitable for an investor’s stated
risk level because the broker is required to create and maintain a suitable portfolio for each
particular investor.”).
147. Id. at 175 (“A broker must understand the investor’s financial needs in order to determine
what would suit those needs. In order to do that, the broker must complete an investor profile. The
profile consists of what the client wants the investment to accomplish and the level of risk the
investor is willing to undertake. Rule 2310 and the other suitability rules require a broker to create
an accurate “investor profile” and then use that profile to make proper investments or
recommendations.”).
148. NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310.
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producing activities because her ability to generate income apart from the
contemplated investment is central to the amount of risk she may be
prepared to sustain, since typically, a professionally employed individual or
family is better suited to put invested capital at risk than one who is
disabled or without ready ability to replace or contribute additional
principal for investment purposes; 3) the client’s other assets because of the
general desire to preserve a core of assets that can be sustained in a
relatively risk-free investment, since often a client who owns a home or
other significant investments is better suited to sustain risk in an investment
account than one who has no other assets.
“In a section entitled, ‘Know Your Customer,’ the Series 7 study guide
advises that before making a recommendation, a broker should appreciate
the customer’s balance sheet, the customer’s income statement, nonfinancial investment considerations, and the customer’s investment
outlook.”149 Risk tolerance in financial terms is “[t]he degree of uncertainty
that an investor can handle in regards to a negative change in the value of
their portfolio.”150 A familiar example provides that because “[a]n
investor’s risk tolerance varies according to age, income requirements,
financial goals, etc. . . . a 70-year-old retired widow would generally have a
lower risk tolerance than a single 30-year-old executive.”151
In Louros v. Kreicas, the client’s “risk tolerance was ‘aggressive’ (the
other choices were ‘moderate’ and ‘conservative’).”152 Another example of
risk tolerance can be stated in terms of investment goals.
Preservation of capital—‘A person with this as his most important
objective would not be willing to invest in most equity securities. ... In
general, when clients speak of safety, they usually mean preservation of
capital from losses due to credit or financial risk. Financial risk is the
danger of losing all or part of the principal amount a person has
invested.’153

“All investments involve some degree of risk. According to the oftquoted maxim, ‘The greater the risk assumed by the investor, the greater the
potential reward.’ But just what are the risks inherent in an investment?
What risks should be considered in determining the suitability of an
investment recommended by a broker?”154
The most important considerations in determining CARL do not have to
do with goals, but with a client’s ability to sustain and recover from losses,
149. ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-5, at 5-14.
150. Risk Tolerance, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/risktolerance.asp
(last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
151. Id.
152. Louros v. Kreicas, 367 F. Supp. 2d 572, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
153. ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-5, at 5-14 (citing PASSTRAK SERIES 7, a study guide on
Know Your Customer duties).
154. Id.
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or “risk tolerance.” If a client expresses goals that are incompatible with her
risk profile,155 it is the broker’s duty to reconcile the expectations of return
with the anticipation of risk before making any recommendation.156
Accordingly, without such reconciliation of goals and risks, a broker is not
positioned to make any recommendations to the client, as such recommenddation would either fail to meet the investor’s goal or exceed her risk
expectation.
A survey of risk tolerance options available for selection on account
opening documents of broker-dealers shows a wide diversity in the way that
firms allow clients to describe their own vision of risk tolerance.157
Discussions of client risk in legal and arbitration fora tend to focus on three
general categories: conservative, moderate, and aggressive (or
speculative).158
155. An example of contradictory goals and risk expectation would be a goal 20% annual, taxfree income without risk of loss of principal. A Broker could explain that 20% returns may be
achieved, but can not be anticipated without a high degree of risk, possibly including leverage;
that tax-free income is only available in a limited number of investments, namely municipal
bonds, which tend to offer only slight premiums above US Government-backed bonds, and are not
likely to approach 20% in normal circumstances; or that the only “risk-free” investments in
securities are US Government-backed bonds which offer a modest return nowhere near 20%
annually, historically. The Broker could further suggest that a goal of 8% annual returns might be
possible, with a portfolio comprised of US Government-backed bonds, Municipal Bonds, and
equities that would not put all of the client’s principal at risk.
156. Cohen, supra note 110, at 1607–08.
157. ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-5, at 5-13–5-14.
Few opening account forms delineate an investor’s true investment objectives because
the categories to check off on the forms are either too general or not applicable or
otherwise cannot define the customer’s needs. A survey of the “investment
objectives” portion of many opening account forms found a myriad of possibilities:
income, income and growth, businessperson’s risk, speculation, investment grade,
growth, investment hedge, safety of principal, tax-sheltered income, long-term
growth, short term trading, trading, appreciation with safety, appreciation with risk,
tax free income, trading profits, intermediate term, good quality, high risk,
conservative growth, and aggressive growth. “Unfortunately, many new account
forms are limited in their ability to accurately describe a customer’s objective. This
can cause real problems when the testimony surrounding the issue of investment
objectives occurs many years later . . . compounded by the fact that until recently,
customers were not sent copies of their new account forms unless the forms were for
an options account.” It is important for a customer’s attorney to appreciate the various
investment objectives a broker should have discussed with a customer so that if a loss
took place based on a recommended investment, counsel can determine whether the
broker engaged in a substantive conversation on this issue.
Id.

158. On November 14, 2006 the following LexisNexis search produced 129 results, composed
of NASD and NYSE reported awards and disciplinary decisions: “Source: Securities > SelfRegulatory Organizations (SRO) Materials > Combined NYSE & NASD materials” “Terms:
client w/25 (conservative or moderate or aggressive or speculative).” On November 14, 2006 the
following LexisNexis search produced 26 results, composed of federal and state suitability
decisions and disciplinary decisions reviews: “Source: Securities > Cases & Court Rules > Federal
and State Securities Cases” “Terms: client w/25 (conservative or moderate or aggressive or
speculative) & suitab! w/25 securit!”

260

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 1

The client’s description of her own risk tolerance, however, is not the
end of the inquiry for a broker, as he is still bound by the Know Your
Customer duties.159 It may be the case that a broker’s dutiful investigation
leads him to discover that his client has not honestly described her financial
condition or situation, or that such a condition or situation may have
changed due to factors such as illness, divorce, or unemployment. Additionally, a client may not be in a position to accurately describe her own risk
tolerance, while the trained broker can make such an assessment.
The broker is bound to make recommendations suitable for the CARL,
regardless of the client’s subjective opinion of what suitable risk may be.
This is not to say that the broker may not place unsolicited orders for a
client, but only that recommendations by the broker should not
conveniently fit the client’s self-assessed risk level, when the broker knows
the CARL to be lower, or more conservative.
As a general rule, it is not appropriate for a broker to determine that a
client’s CARL is higher than she suggests, or more aggressive or
speculative, regardless of the client’s financial condition or situation,
because it should be the client’s informed decision as to the maximum
amount of risk she wants to take on with her funds.160 In fact, the overestimate of his client’s risk tolerance is what often leads to claims of
unsuitability. Another situation where the broker’s estimate of his client’s
CARL is different than her selected CARL may occur when a client elects
to have multiple accounts with divergent goals and risk tolerances (e.g., one
account with broker X invested solely in money market funds and another
account with broker Y in which she chooses to make more speculative or
aggressive investments). In such a situation, the broker is restricted to
making recommendations that conform with his clients’ selected CARL.
Thus, the client may set the higher bound of risk for herself, and the
broker may be bound to make recommendations of a more conservative
nature.161 This duty may be owed to any investor, but certainly more so in
159. See supra note 18.
160. Root, supra note 10, at 298 (“‘Risks involved in a change in investment objectives must be
explained, and the broker-dealer should not solicit a customers purchase of securities
“inappropriate in light of the customer’s financial situation.’” (quoting Fishman, Broker-Dealer
Obligations to Customers—The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 MINN. L. REV. 233, 243 (1966))). “The
courts in Tiernan v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co. . . . and Alton . . . both use the term
‘inappropriate’ to be interchangeable with ‘unsuitable.’” Id. at 298 n.38.
161. Rapp, supra note 29, at 265–66.
In 1971, Stephen Cohen argued for integration of economic theory into a legal
standard for suitability determinations in a manner that addresses the essential point.
He asserted that a suitability determination should be based upon an assessment of
investor risk preferences: Willingness to bear risk being the first consideration and
then, incorporating earlier work of Mundheim, the capacity to bear it. This produces
the notion of a ‘risk threshold’ as the critical constraint on the freedom of brokers to
make recommendations to their customers. Thus, “A widow with a moderate amount
of capital . . . might be anxious to speculate and to incur high risks. But such
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the case of an individual investor as compared to an institutional investor.
Prof. Poser discussed a California Court of Appeals interpretation of a
broker’s duty in regard to an institutional investor in the case of Duffy v.
King Cavalier:
It is true that the decision requires the broker to “second guess” his
customers’ expressed wishes; however, the customer in Duffy was an
institution, whose true investment objectives may not have been identical
to the investment objectives as they were understood by the
representatives who dealt with the broker. In this situation, it is not
unreasonable to impose on the broker a duty to inquire whether the stated
investment objectives are in the customer’s best interests. The broker, as a
professional, may have been in a better position than the representatives
of the institution to determine the suitability of the recommended
investments.162

III. COMPARING RQ TO CARL IS AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD
FOR DETERMINING SUITABILITY
Because a broker has a responsibility to understand the risk inherent in
a recommendation, to know his client’s CARL, and to only recommend
securities that appropriate are appropriate for her, an objective standard for
determining suitability can be established using fundamental financial
theories.
A. BROKER’S RESPONSIBILITY TO EXPLAIN RISK
Among the broker’s duties to an investor is the duty to explain the risks
of a recommended security.163 The omnipresent legends that adorn a vast
quantity of a broker-dealer’s or issuer’s literature include warnings such as:
“past performance is not indicative of future results,” “results can not be
guaranteed,” “deposits are not guaranteed by the FDIC,” “investments may
lose value, including the principal amount invested,”164 and many others.
All such warnings are intended to put the investor on notice that there is
risk in making investments in the securities markets. These must be
displayed prominently on prospecti, analysts’ reports, advertisements, and
other documents, to comply with government and SRO rules and
regulations.165

speculation would be beyond her ability or capacity to bear risk if a prudent investor
in her situation would not adopt that strategy.”
Id.

162.
163.
164.
165.

POSER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-100–3-101 (emphasis added).
Cf. Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969).
See generally Rule 482 of the Securities Act of 1933.
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. 77g (2000).
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B. INVESTORS ALSO HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY
When an investor determines to enter the securities markets, it is
presumed that she has been made aware of the risks inherent in making
such an investment. Accordingly, an investor is not absolved of the
responsibility for thought, contemplation, and decision-making that such an
investor must entertain before depositing a check into an investment
account.166 The manifold notices, disclaimers, and legends are designed to
assure that this determination is made knowingly and—notwithstanding
exceptional circumstances such as fraudulent inducement—that such a
presumption is legally plausible.167
The SEC’s execution of its mandate under the ‘34 Act was interpreted
by the Second Circuit when it stated that “[t]he core of Rule 10b-5 is the
implementation of the Congressional purpose that all investors should have
equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. It was
the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be
subject to identical market risks.”168 Thus, both Congress and courts have
recognized that the gains anticipated by investors are accompanied by
risks.169 The numerous disclosures and legends that accompany securities
materials are clearly intended to convey the risks and dangers associated
with investing in securities to all investors, and prospective investors.
C. SECURITIES INVESTORS ACCEPT MARKET RISK
Investors are deemed to have been warned about the risks associated
with investing, and that they themselves are subject to the market risks.
This presumption follows from a broker’s duty of informing his client.
Therefore, “an investor [] implicitly assumes the commercial risk that a
change in market conditions may produce adverse economic
consequences.” 170 Thus, an investor takes on market risk by investing in the
securities markets unless she instruct her broker that she was only willing to
sustain lesser levels of risk. Stated differently, investors assume a market-

166. See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993) (regarding
justifiable reliance).
167. See, e.g., id. at 1032–33.
168. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851–852 (2d Cir. 1968).
169. Id. (The SEC’s Rule 10b-5, promulgated under its 1934 Act authority, elaborates on the
types of conduct prohibited in connection with the purchase or sale of a security). See also
Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 279 A.D.2d 239, 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(“[R]ecovery is unavailable even in the face of actual loss where such loss results from an inherent
market risk assumed by the investor” (emphasis added) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v
Robert Christopher Assocs., 257 A.D.2d 1, 12–13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999))); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974)).
170. Robert Christopher Assocs., 257 A.D.2d at 12–13. “Finally, as a fundamental principle, a
contracting party—especially one denominated an investor—implicitly assumes the commercial
risk that a change in market conditions may produce adverse economic consequences.” Id.
(emphasis added). These risks, however, are distinct from the risks of individual securities.
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level of risk by investing in the securities markets, unless they specify
otherwise to their brokers.
Broker-dealers and claimants alike cite the well-managed account
theory of damages which can be used to argue for a reduction of a firm’s
liability in a bear market171 or a boost to the claimant’s damages in a bull
market.172 The theory was explained by the Second Circuit in Rolf v. Blyth
as such:
The district court should then reduce Rolf’s gross economic loss by the
average percentage decline in value of the Dow Jones Industrials, the
Standard & Poor’s Index, or any other well recognized index of value, or
combination of indices, of the national securities markets during the
period commencing with Stott’s aiding and abetting and terminating with
its cessation. Thus if during the relevant period the stock market declined
in value by 25%, then Rolf’s gross economic loss should be reduced by
25%.173

As investors accept market risks upon entering the securities investment
arena, this establishes a threshold of acceptable risk for investors, because
“recovery is unavailable even in the face of actual loss where such loss
results from an inherent market risk assumed by the investor.”174 Whether
or not an investment is suitable can be determined by comparing the risks of
the recommended investment with the amount of risk the investor accepted
by entering the markets.
IV. SUGGESTED STANDARDS COMPARING RQ & CARL TO
DETERMINE SUITABILITY
Because “[t]he professional intermediary must be oriented in his or her
investment recommendations either by the creation or existence of a
portfolio with identifiable risk/return characteristics and then by the
expected impact of a particular recommendation on the performance of that
portfolio,”175 he should be judged accordingly.
The . . . suitability rule[s may] be violated in two different ways. First, a
broker may violate the suitability rules if he fails so fundamentally to
comprehend the consequences of his own recommendation that such
recommendation is unsuitable for any investor, regardless of the investor’s
171. Bear Market Definition, supra note 59.
172. Bull market, Investopedia.com, http://investopedia.com/terms/b/bullmarket.asp (last
visited Nov. 21, 2006) (“A financial market of a certain group of securities in which prices are
rising or are expected to rise.”).
173. Rolf v. Blyth, 570 F.2d 38, 44–47 (2d Cir. 1978).
174. Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 279 A.D.2d 239, 244 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (emphasis added) (citing Robert Christopher Assocs., 257 A.D.2d at 12–13); Tannebaum v.
Clark, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4088 (D. Ill. 1993); DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y, 920
F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that the plaintiff failed to show loss caused by risk and
volatility of investment rather than by market forces).
175. Rapp, supra note 29, at 268.
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wealth, willingness to bear risk, age, or other individual characteristics.
More commonly, however, the suitability rules will be violated by a
recommendation that might be suitable for some investors but is
unsuitable for a specific investor to whom the recommendation is
directed.176

Because these two types of suitability violations can be objectively
described and broad parameters can be laid, the field of what suitability
cases can be argued in good faith can effectively be narrowed.
A. AN RQ ≤ 1.0 IS PRESUMPTIVELY SUITABLE FOR ANY INVESTOR
Any recommendation, either of an individual security or for a portfolio,
with a Risk Quotient less than or equal to one (RQ ≤ 1.0) should be
presumed suitable for any investor because any investor who enters the
securities market should be prepared and able to sustain market losses,
unless she made her low tolerance for risk known to her broker.177 Some
clients may not be able or willing to accept market risk, and may choose not
to accept such risk with some or all of their funds. If a client is not able or
willing to accept market risk with their funds, her broker should reject any
and all orders to avoid potential liability.
B. AN RQ ≥ 2.0 IS PRESUMPTIVELY UNSUITABLE FOR ANY
INVESTOR
Despite the fact that “[i]f the investor’s risk tolerance is high, he or she
can be expected to assume higher non-diversifiable systematic risk given by
higher beta stocks,”178 there is a limit to the amount of risk that is
reasonable for most investors. A Risk Quotient of greater than two (RQ ≥
2.0) should be presumed unsuitable for a “conservative” or “moderate”
CARL investor, unless the recommendation is made as a component of a
portfolio179 which has a CARL-appropriate Risk Quotient. This is true
176. See F.J. Kaufman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-27535, 50 S.E.C. 164 (Dec. 13,
1989); Reinsch, supra note 10, at 199.
177. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 199.
If the overall portfolio beta is much higher than 1, the portfolio carries a risk level
higher than that of the stock market as a whole and is not suitable for an investor who
is unable or unwilling to assume above average risk. Conversely, if the overall
portfolio beta is much less than 1, the portfolio has relatively low risk and is
unsuitable for an investor who is able and willing to assume above average risk.
Id.

178. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 195
179. Rapp, supra note 29, at 272 (“Portfolio-driven recommendations must be treated
differently than those that are only security-driven.”).
The standard of care against which the suitability responsibility of brokers is to be
measured should be grounded in the dichotomy between stand-alone and portfolio
recommendations. The inquiry should begin with the question of whether a
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because excessive risk fails to provide incremental returns under Modern
Portfolio Theory,180 and is therefore unsuitable.181 The burden of such
objective standards on broker-dealers must be weighed against their
certainty and freedom to operate and also against the potential benefits to

recommendation is reasonably designed for the creation of, or to contribute to, a
portfolio, the risk/return characteristics of which are reasonably matched to the
investment objective, which is in turn a function of financial profile and risk
preference of the investor. Where there is no identifiable and reasonable portfolio
orientation for a recommendation, the isolated consideration of that recommendation
is entirely appropriate. But a recommendation that is shown to be reasonably based as
a portfolio component should not be evaluated on the basis of its stand-alone risk in
isolation from the portfolio. In its most practical application, as a defense against
unsuitability claims, MPT compels this result.
Id. at 273.
180. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 199.
According to MPT, individual stock risk can and should be reduced or diversified
away by combining stocks that are not positively correlated. If an investor
consciously chooses to over-concentrate his or her resources in a single stock or a set
of correlated stocks, the investment strategy is clearly unsuitable and he or she alone
is responsible for the consequences that might follow. However, market risk, which
affects the stock market as a whole and is also called systematic risk, cannot be
diversified away. The entire stock market could conceivably be pulled down by some
unexpected bad economic or political news and this is likely to have an adverse effect
on all stocks in one’s portfolio regardless of the care taken to create a well-diversified
holding. For example, a terrorist attack will cause an immediate collapse of the stock
market, pulling down all stocks.
Id.
Erlich set the stage for two cases from the Seventh Circuit. In 1988, that court
reasoned that when investment advisors make decisions, they do not view individual
investments in isolation. Rather, the goal is to create a diversified portfolio that
balances appropriate levels of risk and return for the investor. The risk of a given
investment is neutralized somewhat when the investment is combined with others in a
diversified portfolio. The risk inherent in the entire portfolio is less than that of certain
assets within that portfolio. Ideally, after diversification only market risk remains.
Likewise, the return from a portfolio over time should be more stable than that of
isolated investments within that portfolio.
Id. at 176.
181. In a search for the highest current and long-term risk-rated mutual funds by Morningstar
(“Morningstar Risk Score” of “5” and “Rating for Morningstar Risk Score” 10Yr of “5”), seven
mutual funds had the highest rating in both categories. Out of this group the highest β was 3.4 by
the Rydex U.S. Government Bond Inv. Fund (“RYGBX”), which had achieved a year-to-date
return of -13.34% by December 2, 2005. The second highest β was 3.31 by the Apex Mid Cap
Growth (“BMCGX”), which had posted 24.02% losses by December 2, 2005. As a group, the
seven had an average 3-year β of 2.575 and an average year-to-date return of -2.80% as of
December 2, 2005. The risk of loss from high β investments has been real for these investors.
Meanwhile, the highest performance for 2005 has been turned in by the BlackRock Global
Resources Instl. Fund (“SGLSX”) which has a β of 0.83 and “Year to Date Return” of 44.63% and
“5-Year Average Return” of 34.29%. Morningstar Ratings CD-ROM (2005); Yahoo!, Finance,
http://finance.yahoo.com for 3-year β and performance statistics and rankings (last visited Nov.
20, 2006).
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investors. Whatever the burden, it is less now than in the past due to the
development of electronic oversight and compliance programs.182
C. THE IMPACT OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR SUITABILITY
A clear and well-defined standard for suitability would have a significant impact on the brokerage industry. Many claims would be prevented
by more reasoned recommendations by brokers and with an opportunity for
better supervision by broker-dealers of the recommendations their brokers
make. Further, electronic supervision could be effective if boundaries for
conduct are set. In addition to the prevention of client losses due to more
reasoned recommendations, claimants’ attorneys would be better positioned
to determine what claims would be colorable and respondents’ attorneys
would likely settle a larger proportion of those colorable claims. Remained
claims could be decided on the basis of objective comparison of conduct to
a clear and well-defined standard.
1. Thousands of Claims Could be Prevented When the Next
Market Correction Occurs
As discussed above, actual losses to investors’ accounts precipitate the
vast majority of unsuitability claims. The quantity of investors who lose
enough principal to make a claim increases dramatically during bear
markets,183 when losses outpace gains, and during market corrections.184 If
an objective standard has been adopted before the next market correction
occurs, thousands of claims could be prevented.
182. Barnett, supra note 73, at 1122–23.
In fact, suitability review technology is already in existence. E*Trade has been
looking for a vendor to provide the online broker with technology that would enable it
to conduct suitability reviews of online trades. Suitability review technology would
use algorithms and mathematical formulas to determine whether a specific trade is
appropriate for a particular customer. With this type of review, online brokers could
identify unsophisticated online investors attempting to purchase securities that are too
risky for their financial position and notify the investors about their findings. Some
industry participants believe that online technology enables brokers to assess
customer suitability more easily than if a customer traded via a traditional broker.
n164 Additionally, online brokers would only be required to run these suitability
checks on a portion of their customers who are classified as unsophisticated. This
limitation will reduce the additional costs that online brokers anticipate as a result of
running suitability checks. Furthermore, it is arguably better for online investors and
the economy as a whole to pay slightly higher prices in exchange for suitability
checks, which provide investor protection and promote investor confidence.
Id.

183

Bear Market Definition, supra note 59.

184. Unsuitability claims doubled from 2001 to 2003, attributable in large part to the burst of
the so-called “tech bubble” in 2001. The reason for the delay, from March 2001 when the
NASDAQ peaked, to 2003 can be explained by the time required by investors to realize their
losses, retain attorneys, and file claims.
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If the proposed standard is implemented and enforced by brokerdealers, the majority of investors would remain within the bounds of broad
market declines and gains, and thus would be more likely to realize the
long-term benefits of investment in the securities markets. Such a result
would undoubtedly be positive for individual investors and for the
securities industry as a whole.
2. More Reasoned Recommendations by Brokers
At the present time, brokers are required to have a reasonable basis for
the belief of the suitability of their recommendations, but proving such
belief is difficult without objective evidence. Under the proposed standards,
brokers would be better able to support their recommendations by
reproducing the analysis they engaged in when they originally made the
recommendations. This contrasts with the current standard. Reasonable is
relative and whether or not a security is later determined to have been
suitable depends on many factors. Most troubling for brokers, this analysis
comes with the clarity of hindsight and a security’s actual performance
which, in most arbitration claims, is a significant financial loss.
Brokers make recommendations to their clients that have CARL appropriate RQs, will be better positioned to inform their clients as to why those
recommendations are suitable and to defend their recommendations should
a clam be brought against them months or years later.
3. An Opportunity for Better Supervision by Broker-Dealers
Broker-dealers are charged with supervision of their brokers, and can be
held liable for negligent supervision if their brokers’ recommendations are
determined to be unsuitable. The “red flags” which signal that an
investigation is required for a certain account depend on monitoring the
signals of executed trades and the actual performance of the clients’
accounts.185 Broker-dealer supervision would be greatly aided by a clear,
well-defined standard for judging the suitability of these trades before
losses are realized. Broker-dealers could assign a CARL level for every
account by using the questions regarding the client’s desired level of risk
currently on account opening applications,186 and the brokers’ input.
Only with an objective standard for brokers can the broker-dealer’s
duty of supervision be objectively judged. Without a clear and well-defined
standard, the broker-dealer is subjectively determined to be liable to their
clients regardless of the level of care exercised.

185. The use of so called “comfort letters” by broker-dealers is an example of retrospective
supervision, where contact is initiated with a customer after she has realized significant losses to
her account.
186. See supra note 159 (regarding risk determinations based on account opening documents).
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4. Electronic Oversight of Recommendations
Effective electronic oversight of recommendations would be possible
with the objective measure of suitability proposed by this article. Such
systems have already been developed and are in use by some brokerdealers,187 but for such oversight to be effective, meaningful parameters
need to be set for the systems to monitor.
With the proposed CARL and RQ levels, a broker-dealer would be able
to monitor the accounts of all clients on an ongoing basis. The systems
could measure the individual recommendation’s RQ against the appropriate
account’s CARL, and notify the broker, supervisor and client along with the
trade confirmation which is already required to be prepared and sent to the
client. In addition to the individual recommendation, broker-dealers could
monitor clients’ portfolio RQs at the time of every trade or upon periodic
review, and notify their clients of the amount of risk that their principal is
exposed to at that time.
5. Claimants’ Attorneys Would Bring Fewer Claims
Whether or not broker-dealers changed their recommendations to conform to the proposed standards, claimants’ attorneys would not file as many
unsuitability claims. This would occur because claimants’ attorneys would
be able to determine in advance whether or not the trades that their clients
complained of had RQs that were appropriate for their client’s CARL, and
whether their clients’ portfolio RQ was appropriate.188
There would be two distinct results of the application of the proposed
standard by claimants’ attorneys. First, attorneys would be effectively
barred from bringing claims that they did not have a good faith belief to be
unsuitable as judged against the proposed standard. Second, those claims
filed would be vetted for at least a colorable claim of unsuitability. As a
result, there would be fewer filed claims and those claims would better
plead cases for unsuitability.
6. Respondents’ Attorneys Would be Able to Settle the
Better Claims
Broker-dealers faced an average of 2,516 unsuitability claims through
the NASD during the 2001 through 2004 calendar years. With the
significant decrease in the quantity of claims contemplated above, through
more reasoned recommendations, better supervision, electronic oversight,
187. See supra note 183 (regarding electronic oversight by on-line broker-dealers).
188. It is true that the argument may shift focus to what the CARL is, but broker-dealers are
already required to make reasonable inquiry into a client’s financial situation and goals. Further,
broker-dealers are in a position to require that brokers and supervisors make an accurate
determination of CARL upon the opening of an account, and periodically thereafter. Brokerdealers may also require that confirmation of a CARL be made with the clients, as well.
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and claimants’ attorneys bringing only better pled claims, broker-dealers
could see a dramatic reduction in the number of claims against them. As a
result, broker-dealers would be in a position to settle a larger proportion of
the claims that were made, and dispose of the remainder more quickly. The
quick disposition of ill-advised claims would be possible with the application of an objective standard by arbitrators analogous to summary
judgment relief.
7. Arbitration Panels Would Objectively Determine the
Remaining Claims
With a clear, well-defined standard of conduct for brokers, and the
historical data available to both claimants and respondents, an objective
determination by arbitration panels would be possible. Whether or not a
recommendation was suitable alone or within a portfolio would be
presumptively determined based on verifiable facts about which parties to
the arbitration could stipulate, as the beta of a security, the amount of equity
in the position at the time of purchase and the portfolio’s RQ would not be
subject to argument. This opportunity for objective comparison is in sharp
contrast to the determination of current claims where the actual loss and the
current financial position of the investor-client are surely more influential
factors than they need to be.
D. THE NECESSITY OF A CLEAR, WELL-DEFINED STANDARD FOR
MEANINGFUL REVIEW OF UNSUITABILITY AWARDS AND THE
CONTINUED APPLICABILITY OF THE FAA
As the Supreme Court noted in McMahon, when securities claims were
held to be within the enforcement powers of the Federal Arbitration Act,189
“although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements
of the statute.” It may, therefore, be argued that the enforceability of predispute agreements to arbitrate requires the opportunity for “sufficient”
judicial review. If, however, review of arbitration awards is not sufficient,
securities claims, specifically unsuitability, may not be subject to arbitration
due to § 29(a) of the ‘34 Act, which states that “[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of
this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
exchange required thereby shall be void.”

189. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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1. The Conflict Between McMahon and the Benderson and
Wallace Decisions
In Wallace v. Butar the Second Circuit held that “[a]n arbitral award
may be vacated for manifest disregard of the law ‘only if a reviewing court
. . . finds both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet
refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the
arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.’”190
The Second Circuit has applied this reasoning in reviewing the securities
arbitration awards in Wallace and Benderson.191 In Benderson, the court
stated that “GMS [the broker,] neither points this court to case law
interpreting the terms ‘recommendation’ or ‘suitability,’ nor points to
anywhere in the record where such law was brought to the attention of the
arbitrators.”192
The current subjective reasonable belief of the broker standard for
determining suitability is not what the Second Circuit held was required for
vacation of an arbitration award on the grounds of manifest disregard. Thus,
because the current standard is not a well-defined and explicit law, the ‘34
Acts’ restriction on contracting away protections are at odds with the
sufficient review component of the Supreme Court’s McMahon and
decision.
2. Averting a Crisis for Securities Arbitration
It appears that a crisis is brewing in securities arbitration because of the
lack of legally sufficient review of awards. Therefore, the very
enforceability of arbitration agreements is in question unless a well-defined
and explicit standard is adopted to avert this brewing crisis.
Blair H. Wallace*

190.
191.
192.
*

Wallace v. Butar, 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 75 (2d Cir. 2003).
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